Force Majeure and Other Coronavirus-Era Legal Challenges: Lessons for Resource-Dependent Countries from the Glencore-Zambia Dispute
Like the rest of the global economy, the coronavirus pandemic has hit the extractive sector hard. Oil prices have free fallen. Most metals prices have plummeted in the first quarter of 2020, with low prices projected throughout the rest of the year. Operations at 265 mines across 34 countries have been disrupted, as operators struggle with depressed demand, hampered transport and logistics, and disrupted supply chains.
In the face of these grim realities, extractive companies may attempt to excuse, delay or otherwise revise their contractual or legal obligations.
Companies may also seek to negotiate “alternatives” to force majeure that involve other claims under law or contract, or requests for exemptions from law.
Governments in resource-dependent countries should not be caught off guard by these claims, particularly at a time when they urgently need funds to respond to the present health and economic crises. Glencore’s recent stand-off with Zambia over plans to shut mines provides some useful lessons to help governments get prepared.
Zambia’s stand-off with Glencore
In early April, Glencore’s Zambia subsidiary, Mopani Copper Mines, announced plans to place its mines on “care and maintenance” (i.e., a cessation of production) citing “the impacts of a rapid decline in the copper price […] further impacted by the critical disruptions to international mobility, transportation and supply chains arising from COVID-19.” The announcement did not specifically cite force majeure and Zambian legislation allows companies to suspend production, with 90 days’ notice and the mines minister’s approval, for reasons other than force majeure.
Nevertheless, Zambia’s mines minister said the company had earlier declared force majeure and protested the move, which he said would put 11,000 jobs at risk. He stated that there were no grounds for a force majeure claim because events did not make continued mining impossible, nor did Mopani comply with the notice requirements.
The conflict escalated with Zambian authorities threatening to revoke Mopani’s licenses. The company subsequently backed down, agreed to restart mining and provided 90 days’ notice of its intent to place the mines on care and maintenance.
For now, talks appear to be moving in a positive direction. Mopani has indicated it would continue to discuss potential solutions with the government during the notice period.
But governments faced with similar challenges should take note and consider the following actions.
1. Proactively review extractive sector contracts and laws
This will enable officials to understand the scope and requirements of both force majeure and other provisions under which companies might seek to adjust their contractual or legal obligations.
In reviewing force majeure clauses, authorities should scrutinize:
- the bases for claiming force majeure
- any mitigation and notice requirements
- the consequences of force majeure (including whether a party is excused from performance altogether or the time frame for performance is extended for the duration of the force majeure event)
Further, the Mufulira-Nkana force majeure clause also requires the party making the claim to take “all reasonable precautions, due care and reasonable alternative measures with the objective of avoiding such failure and of carrying out its obligations under [the] [a]greement.” Glencore’s subsequent submission of a proposal to the government suggests that the company had not yet thoroughly explored alternative measures when it made its initial statement.
Governments should therefore note that inclusion of epidemics or other relevant events in force majeure clauses does not end the inquiry. Causation and mitigation requirements included in the contract are key. Recent English precedent is instructive in this regard. In Seadrill Ghana Operations Ltd v Tullow Ghana Ltd, the court found that Tullow could not rely on force majeure under its drilling services contract with Seadrill. This was because the event Tullow cited was not the sole reason for Tullow’s inability to perform (i.e. there were also reasons other than the claimed force majeure event) and, further, Tullow had not used “reasonable endeavours” to circumvent the force majeure event (e.g., drilling in other available, albeit less profitable, fields).
Moreover, governments’ scrutiny of contracts and law should go beyond force majeure clauses. As noted above, Mopani’s statement did not explicitly invoke force majeure, and the contract includes another clause providing for suspension of production pursuant to Zambia’s Mines and Minerals Act. The company’s discussions with the government may have centered around these provisions.
Government officials can therefore expect that companies may seek to exercise other rights or raise other legal issues under their contracts, beyond force majeure. Officials should review, for example, clauses that provide for time extensions or renegotiation on the basis of material adverse changes in circumstances.
In a recent New Producers Group Project discussion on force majeure a national oil company executive shared that they were preparing a thorough analysis of active extractive contracts to identify risks and prepare the government responses.
2. Beware of requests for deviations from legal requirements
Officials should be aware that in seeking alternatives to non-performance, extractive companies are likely to press for different kinds of deviations from or exceptions to the law. Governments should approach such requests with caution.
Zambia’s mines ministry indicated that Mopani had sought tax relief from the government, specifically with respect to value added tax. Zambia’s chamber of mines has also urged the government to provide tax relief, citing the dispute with Mopani as an indication of how “desperate” the industry’s financial circumstances have become.
In Colombia, some 25 business leaders, including the president of the Colombia Mining Association, wrote to the president calling on the government to simplify procedures with respect to royalties, prior consultations with Afro and indigenous communities, and obtaining environmental licenses. Critics of the proposals fear that industry is using the pandemic as a pretext to further dilute environmental standards that have already been weakened since 2014. They further questioned the economic benefit, pointing out that some of the executives represent companies with pending license applications and whose projects will not begin operations for several years.
When considering how to respond to such requests, government officials may want to consider current goals for the sector, based on:
- its overall importance to the economy
- the economic importance of particular projects at the national or local level
- what phase various projects are in (i.e., exploration, development or production)
- what the government most needs from the sector, whether revenues, employment or both
3. Take policy decisions transparently
It is crucial that government officials take any decisions to grant legal deviations transparently. This will both reassure the public that concessions are in the country’s best interest and avoid any risks of corruption. Governments should publish details of relief granted to extractive sector companies, including:
- full text of amended contracts, laws, orders or other documents providing relief terms
- names of companies or projects claiming and receiving relief if relief is not sector-wide
- basis for the decision to provide such relief
- expected duration of such relief (even if the end date may not be certain; governments should keep the public informed as the situation evolves)
Nicola Woodroffe is a senior legal analyst with the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI).
Photo credit: Zambia copper mine by Flickr user mwmbwls via Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0) license
Authors
Nicola Woodroffe
Senior Legal Analyst